



*Designed by James Dunthorne.*

*Engr'd by T. Rowlandson.*

*— And yet by turns the bitter change of fierce extremes,*

# AGUE & FEVER.

*Extremes by change more fierce.*  
*Milton.*

*Pub. as the Act directs March 29 1788 by T. Rowlandson, N° 90 Pall-mall Street.*

Schüttelfrost & Fieber, T. Rowlandson after J. Dunthorne, 1788, Q: Wellcome Collection

The background image is a historical engraving from 1788. It depicts a domestic interior. On the left, a man in a red tunic and white head covering sits by a large fire in a fireplace, warming himself. On the right, a woman in a red dress and white headscarf sits at a desk, writing. The room is decorated with a large Christmas tree in the center, a chandelier, and various household items. The title 'AGUE & FEVER' is printed at the bottom of the engraving.


**Das doppelte Fieber aus Klimakrise  
& Demokratiegefährdung und wie  
die Psyche es senken kann – ein  
Impuls aus politischer Perspektive**

80 Jahre BDP

06.06.2026

Dr. Thomas Götz, Berlin

# Heutiges Agenda-Dreieck als Teil von etwas Größerem



Cod. Guelf. 74.1 Aug. 2° ;  
Heinemann-Nr. 2708), Herzog-  
August-Bibliothek, Wolfenbüttel,  
Q:  
<https://pdimagearchive.org/image/s/abe68c4f-386b-4f49-8b30-d7af2c726c8c/>

# Zunächst: Herzlichen Glückwunsch!




*“Don’t overthink it—any wish that’s not about reversing climate change is pretty pointless anyhow.”*

Q: Karl Stevens / The New Yorker Collection/The Cartoon Bank

# Warum ich?


- Studium Humanmedizin in Freiburg i.B.
- FA für Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie & FA für Öffentliches Gesundheitswesen
- Initial „kliniksozialisiert“ (D, CH)
- Zunehmende „Verwaltungssozialisierung“ (Gesundheitsamt FFM, Landesbeauftragter für Psychische Gesundheit in B)
- 12/21 bis 04/23 Staatssekretär für Gesundheit & Pflege bei der SenWGPG in Berlin
- 2023 Mitglied des Vorstandes der Dt. Allianz Klimawandel und Gesundheit (KLUG e.V.)
- 01/24 bis 12/24 Staatssekretär für Gesundheit, Integration & Soziales im MSGIV Brandenburg
- Seit 2025 freiberufliche Beratung im Gesundheits- und Sozialwesen
- Politisch engagiert bei B90/Grünen: ehemals LAG Sprecher Gesundheit und Soziales in B, Koordinator für Koalitionsverhandlungs-Fach AG Gesundheit und Pflege (2021) in B, Koordination Wahlprogrammabschnitt Gesundheit und Pflege (2025), Mitwirkung Resilienzpapier (2025) u.a.




S. Freud, Das Ich und das Es (1923),  
Q: Wiki Commons

# Exkurs: Es gibt nicht DIE Politik (I)

- Vielfältige Definitionen von Politik
- Wikipedia: „Politik bezeichnet die Strukturen (Polity), Prozesse (Politics) und Inhalte (Policy) zur Regelung der Angelegenheiten eines Gemeinwesens durch allgemein verbindliche und somit in der Regel auf politischer Macht beruhende Entscheidungen. Politik regelt dabei insbesondere das öffentliche, aber teilweise auch das private (Zusammen-)Leben der Bürger, die Handlungen und Bestrebungen zur Führung des Gemeinwesens nach innen und außen sowie die Willensbildung und Entscheidungsfindung über Angelegenheiten des Gemeinwesens.“
- Man kann nicht kein:e politische:r Akteur:in sein – „homo politicus“



F. d. Saussure (1916), Q: Wiki Commons



# Exkurs: Politische Identitätenvielfalt

## Key Figure

Illustrating a psychological taxonomy of political variation







Figure 1

The motivational substructure, discursive superstructure, and downstream consequences of political ideology.

Costello 2023

Jost 2009

# Exkurs: Politische Theorie und Praxis



<https://paulcainey.wordpress.com/2017/07/10/5-images-of-the-policy-process/>

# Die Klimakrise (und Biodiversitätskrise)

382 *On the Heat in the Sun's Rays.*

ART. XXXI.—*Circumstances affecting the Heat of the Sun's Rays;*  
by EUNICE FOOTE.

(Read before the American Association, August 23d, 1856.)

My investigations have had for their object to determine the different circumstances that affect the thermal action of the rays of light that proceed from the sun.

Several results have been obtained.

First. The action increases with the density of the air, and is diminished as it becomes more rarified.

The experiments were made with an air-pump and two cylindrical receivers of the same size, about four inches in diameter and thirty in length. In each were placed two thermometers, and the air was exhausted from one and condensed in the other. After both had acquired the same temperature they were placed in the sun, side by side, and while the action of the sun's rays rose to 110° in the condensed tube, it attained only 88° in the other. I had no means at hand of measuring the degree of condensation or rarefaction.

The observations taken once in two or three minutes, were as follows:

Exhausted Tube.		Condensed Tube.	
In shade.	In sun.	In shade.	In sun.
75	80	75	80
76	82	78	95
80	82	80	100
83	86	82	106
84	88	86	110

This circumstance must affect the power of the sun's rays in different places, and contribute to produce their feeble action on the summits of lofty mountains.

Secondly. The action of the sun's rays was found to be greater in moist than in dry air.

In one of the receivers the air was saturated with moisture—in the other it was dried by the use of chlorid of calcium.

Both were placed in the sun as before and the result was as follows:

Dry Air.		Damp Air.	
In shade.	In sun.	In shade.	In sun.
75	75	75	75
78	88	78	90
82	102	82	106
82	104	82	110
82	106	82	114
88	108	92	120

383 *Marcou's Geological Map of the United States.*

The high temperature of moist air has frequently been observed. Who has not experienced the burning heat of the sun that precedes a summer's shower? The isothermal lines will, I think, be found to be much affected by the different degrees of moisture in different places.

Thirdly. The highest effect of the sun's rays I have found to be in carbonic acid gas.


One of the receivers was filled with it, the other with common air, and the result was as follows:

In Common Air.		In Carbonic Acid Gas.	
In shade.	In sun.	In shade.	In sun.
80	90	80	90
81	94	84	100
80	99	84	110
81	100	86	120

The receiver containing the gas became itself much heated—very sensibly more so than the other—and on being removed, it was many times as long in cooling.

An atmosphere of that gas would give to our earth a high temperature; and if as some suppose, at one period of its history the air had mixed with it a larger proportion than at present, an increased temperature from its own action as well as from increased weight must have necessarily resulted.

On comparing the sun's heat in different gases, I found it to be in hydrogen gas, 104°; in common air, 106°; in oxygen gas, 108°; and in carbonic acid gas, 125°.



Eunice Newton Foote 1856, (1819-1888)  
Q: Wikipedia

Sonnabend, 25.11.06 0.50 €  
4. November 2006

**Bild**  
UNABHÄNGIG · ÜBERPATEILICH  
www.bild.de

**UMWELTSCHOCK**

Der gefährlichste blauer Planet. Wie krank ist die Welt, in der wir leben?

**Unsere Erde hat Fieber!**

Spüren Sie's auch?  
► Die Atmosphäre hat Schüttelfrost  
► Unsere Erde rumort!  
► Das Wetter schockt: Hitze, Kälte, Stürme,

Fluten. Unser Planet schreit SOS!  
► Klimaforscher schlagen Alarm: „Unsere Erde hat Fieber!“  
Die Treibhausgase



kochen unsere Atmosphäre. Die Erderwärmung ist gefährlich wie eine glühende Herdplatte: Gletscher schmelzen, Fische sterben aus!

Das Meer steigt. Inseln versinken. Warum? Droht uns die schlimmste Klima-Katastrophe seit der Eiszeit?  
**SONDERSEITE 9**

LEICHTES GEGEN  
Löst zuverlässig den Schleim  
Der Heilungsprozess wird gefördert  
Einfach schnell gegen Husten  
Nur 1 Kapsel pro Tag  
Genial! Mit Mikro-Muskelrelaxantien  
Parfen, die den Wundheilungsprozess fördern  
Nur über den Tag betriebl. pro Tag  
Neue Sch...  
HSV-D...  
Schalk...  
We...  
Tr...  
11  
Themen...  
Doll...  
(40)  
Sprach der...  
ce für zwei Wochen...  
Niederlagen...  
Klein...

Q: Wikipedia

# Die Klimakrise - Erderwärmung




Ed Hawkins, Globale Temperatur 1850-2025/1961-2010, [https://showyourstripes.info/s/Dawson et al. 2025](https://showyourstripes.info/s/Dawson%20et%20al.%202025)

„...dann kamen die großen Worte; die große Botschaft wurde von einem Kontinent zum anderen über den Ozean gesandt...Gehört, allerdings, wurde sie nicht...Durch einen Unfall im Gravitationssystem stürzt die Erde schnell in die Sonne zurück, strebt ihr entgegen, um darin zu zerschmelzen. So lautet die Botschaft: Alles Leben wird enden. Es wird immer heißer werden. Die Hitze wird unerträglich sein für alles Lebende...Und trotzdem, noch sieht man nichts. Noch hört man nichts: Sogar die Botschaft selber ist verstummt.“ C.F. Ramuz, *Présence de la mort*, 1922


# Die Fakten I: Der 6. Assessment Report des Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2023 (AR6, IPCC)

## Adverse impacts from human-caused climate change will continue to intensify


### a) Observed widespread and substantial impacts and related losses and damages attributed to climate change



### b) Impacts are driven by changes in multiple physical climate conditions, which are increasingly attributed to human influence




### c) The extent to which current and future generations will experience a hotter and different world depends on choices now and in the near term





## Limiting warming to 1.5°C and 2°C involves rapid, deep and in most cases immediate greenhouse gas emission reductions

Net zero CO<sub>2</sub> and net zero GHG emissions can be achieved through strong reductions across all sectors




# Die Fakten II: Von Grenzen des Wachstums zu planetaren Grenzen

## 1972 Club of Rome



Planetary Boundary High-Risk Line  
 Safe Operating Space Increasing Risk High Risk Zone  
[www.planetaryhealthcheck.org/planetary-boundaries](http://www.planetaryhealthcheck.org/planetary-boundaries)



Rockström et al. 2024




# Die Fakten IV: Die direkteste Auswirkung von hoher Temperatur auf „die Politik“

iScience

CellPress  
OPEN ACCESS

## Article

The effect of temperature on language complexity:  
Evidence from seven million parliamentary  
speeches



2024



# Was ist die Deutsche Allianz Klimawandel und Gesundheit (KLUG e.V.)?

## Ziele:

- **Aufklärung** über Auswirkungen der Klimakrise auf menschliche Gesundheit sowie über Co-Benefits
- **Transformation** in eine **klimaneutrale & klimaresiliente** Gesellschaft, Begrenzung der Erderwärmung auf 1,5°C
- **Entwicklung** von Strategien zum Schutz vor der Klimaerwärmung bzw. zur Linderung ihrer gesundheitlichen Folgen
- **Klimaneutralität** des Gesundheitssektors
- **Social Tipping Interventionen** (Otto et al. 2020)







Figure 3: Leading change together through target-based change making

Howard et al. 2023

# Risiken und Polykrise – der systemische Blick auf komplexe Herausforderungen



Global Sustainability

cambridge.org/sus

Intelligence Briefing

Cite this article: Coliste, D. et al. (2025). Polycrisis patterns: applying system archetypes to crisis interactions. *Global Sustainability*, 8, e17, 1–11. <https://doi.org/10.1017/sus.2025.21>

Received: 21 July 2024  
Revised: 14 March 2025  
Accepted: 25 March 2025

**Keywords:** adaptation and mitigation; communication and education; human behaviour; planning

## Polycrisis patterns: applying system archetypes to crisis interactions

David Coliste<sup>1</sup>, Cristina I. Apetrei<sup>2</sup>, Linda Booth Sweeney<sup>3</sup>, Jessica Lynch Boucher<sup>4</sup>, Jenson Chong-Leng Goh<sup>5,6</sup>, Olivier Hamant<sup>7</sup>, Christoph E. Mandl<sup>8</sup>, Gillian S. Martin Mehers<sup>9</sup>, Riichiro Oda<sup>10</sup> and Bert J. M. de Vries<sup>11</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden; <sup>2</sup>Faculty of Sustainability, Institute for Ethics and Transdisciplinary Sustainability Research, Leuphana University, Lüneburg, Germany; <sup>3</sup>Toggle Labs for Systems Innovation, Concord, MA, USA; <sup>4</sup>Zelus Ecosystems, London, UK; <sup>5</sup>Engineering Cluster, Singapore Institute of Technology, Singapore; <sup>6</sup>Information Technology Faculty Department, Turība University, Riga, Latvia; <sup>7</sup>Laboratoire de Reproduction et Développement des Plantes, Université de Lyon, Lyon, France; <sup>8</sup>Institute of Production and Logistics, University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences Vienna, Wien, Austria; <sup>9</sup>School of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands; <sup>10</sup>Graduate School of Leadership and Innovation, Shizuoka University, Chuo-ku, Japan and <sup>11</sup>Copernicus Institute of Sustainable Development, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

Rakowski et al. 2025

# Demokratie

Sie ist vielleicht die mächtigste Idee der Galaxie  
 Geboren in Griechenland  
 Millionen gibt sie Hoffnung, Diktatoren fürchten sie  
 Der Grund liegt auf der Hand  
 Doch es gibt sie nicht geschenkt und einfach ist sie nie  
 Sie wird überall bedrängt  
 Sie ist das Beste, was wir haben, aber längst noch  
 nicht perfekt  
 Nein, weit davon entfernt  
 Sie verlangt viel Arbeit, ist ein ewiges Projekt...  
 - Die Ärzte

**FIGURE 11. AUTOCRATIZING VS. DEMOCRATIZING COUNTRIES, 1975-2025**





Figure 11 shows trends of democratization and autocratization over the last 50 years. The left panel displays the number of countries in each category, and the right panel shows the share of the world population living in autocratizing and democratizing countries.

[https://www.v-dem.net/documents/75/V-Dem\\_Institute\\_Democracy\\_Report\\_2026\\_lowres.pdf](https://www.v-dem.net/documents/75/V-Dem_Institute_Democracy_Report_2026_lowres.pdf)



<https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/global-state-of-democracy-2025-democracy-on-the-move?lang=en>


# ABER

## Einstellungen zur Demokratie

### Demokratieidee

Angaben in Prozent

sehr unzufrieden eher unzufrieden eher zufrieden sehr zufrieden



Abweichungen zu 100 Prozent sind rundungsbedingt.

Quelle: Deutschland-Monitor

## Diktaturaffine Einstellungen

Angaben in Prozent

Ablehnung Graubereich Zustimmung



Quelle: Deutschland-Monitor

<https://deutschland-monitor.info/2025/26>



## Democracy and the Challenge of Climate Change

International IDEA Discussion Paper 3/2021

ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS  
2022, VOL. 31, NO. 5, 735–754  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2022.2083478>



## Politicizing climate change in times of populism: an introduction

Jens Marquardt and Markus Lederer

Institute of Political Science, Technical University of Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany

### ABSTRACT

With this introduction to the special issue on climate politics, democracy, and populism, we lay the ground for the multiplicity of analyses that follow. We highlight the essentially contested nature of concepts like (de-)politicization, populism, and democracy that reject the notion of a single definition. We do so by outlining what post-, de-, and re-politicization can mean, how diverse the perspectives on populism are, and which ones help guide us in this special issue. We present the different arenas where the politicization of climate change is happening and which mechanisms are at work, particularly concerning right-wing populism. We discuss our joint understandings of democratic governance and what challenges, as well as opportunities, populism brings to the table. We do not provide a single theoretical framework but rather a typology of the various understandings of these concepts to outline how each contribution relates to it.

**KEYWORDS** Populism; climate politics; democracy; politicization; depoliticization; climate change

ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2025.2538360>



RESEARCH ARTICLE

OPEN ACCESS

## The missing link: democracy, education, and carbon emissions

Patricia Bromley<sup>a</sup>, Jared Furuta<sup>b</sup> and Evan Schofer<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Graduate School of Education and Doerr School of Sustainability, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA; <sup>b</sup>Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA; <sup>c</sup>Department of Sociology, UC Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA

### ABSTRACT

Democracy is thought to play a key role in protecting the environment: in theory, free elections and civil rights allow citizens to hold political leaders accountable, which should then lead to stronger environmental protections. Despite its conceptual appeal, empirical evidence that democratic contexts produce stronger pro-environmental outcomes has been inconclusive. We focus on an overlooked factor – the average level of education in a country – to help explain the heterogeneous effects of democracy on carbon emissions. Using multilevel panel regression models of 155 countries from 1990 to 2019, we find that democracy is associated with reduced carbon emissions at the national level when a country's population has higher overall levels of education. Education, we contend, increases participation in formal and informal political channels, increases media literacy and scientific knowledge, and shapes pro-environmental preferences, which enable democracies to more effectively promote pro-environmental change.

**ARTICLE HISTORY** Received 8 October 2024; Accepted 16 July 2025

**KEYWORDS** Democracy; education; carbon emissions; climate change; cross-national; longitudinal

# Demokratie – Gesundheit & Wohlbefinden

Concepts and New Frontiers for Development

## Democracy: the forgotten determinant of mental health

Marilyn Wise and Peter Sainsbury

### Context

Promoting mental health is a relatively new initiative being taken by organisations, governments and individuals in countries across the world.<sup>1,2</sup> These initiatives have been stimulated, variously, by concerns such as the global burden of depression, high rates of suicide among young people in some populations, and growing evidence of mental health inequalities.<sup>4,6</sup> In addition, even in economically developed nations there is debate about whether the proportion of people expressing satisfaction with their quality of life and/or happiness is increasing with economic growth.<sup>7,8</sup> These illnesses, causes of premature death, and feelings of disappointment, despair and unhappiness are indicators of poor mental health in populations.

At the same time there has been growing evidence that, in addition to biological and behavioural factors, the health of populations is influenced, significantly, by social determinants

of health. Furthermore, the significant, persistent inequalities in health outcomes (including mental health) experienced within and between countries have been found to be positively associated with the unequal distribution of the social determinants of health.<sup>9,12</sup> More explicitly, the unequal distribution of the social determinants of health means that those people and groups who have the most limited access to these experience feelings of alienation, shame, powerlessness, despair and anger – all of which are linked with higher levels of mental ill-health.<sup>7</sup>

If it is to be possible to achieve positive mental health outcomes across populations, and to ensure that the distribution is equitable, it will be necessary to redistribute the social determinants of health. On one hand, this is a major challenge for health promotion specifically and for societies generally. On the other hand, it is within reach. The distribution of the social determinants of health is the responsibility of human decision-

- Zusammenhang (psychische) Gesundheit/Wohlbefinden und Demokratie
- Polarisierung wirkt sich negativ auf psychische Gesundheit aus
- Repräsentation und Akzeptanz von Menschen mit psychischen Beschwerden im politischen Alltag und als Wähler\*innen

nature medicine

Review article

<https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-024-03307-w>

## Political polarization and health

Received: 6 July 2024

Accepted: 18 September 2024

Published online: 25 October 2024

Check for updates

Jay J Van Bavel<sup>1,2</sup>, Shana Kushner Gadarian<sup>3</sup>, Eric Knowles<sup>4</sup> & Kai Ruggeri<sup>5</sup>


In addition to social determinants of health, such as economic resources, education, access to care and various environmental factors, there is growing evidence that political polarization poses a substantial risk to individual and collective well-being. Here we review the impact of polarization and how they are connected to health outcomes, highlighting the COVID-19 pandemic as a case study of the health risks of polarization. We then offer strategies for mitigating potential harms associated with polarization, with an emphasis on building social trust. Finally, we propose future research directions on this topic, underscore the need for more work in a global context and encourage greater collaboration between social scientists and medical scientists. We conclude that polarization is a serious – if largely overlooked – determinant of health, whose impacts must be more thoroughly understood and mitigated.

2025

## The role of health and health systems in shaping political engagement and rebuilding trust in democratic institutions

Anil Menon,<sup>6\*</sup> Nolan M. Kavanagh,<sup>6,c</sup> Michelle Falkenbach,<sup>4,e</sup> Matthias Wismar,<sup>4</sup> and Scott L. Greer<sup>4,e</sup>

a



# Was tun? Individuell (I) – Systemisch (S), oder A (Agency)?

The i-frame and the s-frame: How focusing on individual-level solutions has led behavioral public policy astray

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 September 2022

Nick Chater  and George Loewenstein 

Show author details

Article Related commentaries Metrics

The a-frame in action					
	What roles do individuals in the target population occupy?	What high-impact behaviour could be targeted?	What structures constrain this behaviour for whom?	Agency-aware intervention design	
				Leverage agency	Expand agency
<b>Citizen</b>	Community activist	→ Organizing community campaigns to push for low-carbon infrastructure such as bike lanes	→ Legal/political risks for marginalized groups	→ Target civic groups with high perceived legitimacy	→ Establish formal participatory governance mechanisms
<b>Professional</b>	Hospital procurement officer	→ Select renewable energy provider for the workplace	→ Under-resourced institutions have low budgets	→ Nudge senior procurement officers with defaults	→ Mandate sustainability criteria in procurement policy
<b>Investor</b>	Pension fund manager	→ Shift capital allocation towards low-carbon investments and away from high-emitting assets	→ Limited divestment options in employer pension plans	→ Provide low-carbon investments as defaults	→ Establish climate-risk education and certification for fund managers
<b>Consumer</b>	Urban resident	→ Rent an electric cargo bike when needed instead of buying a car	→ Electric bike rental schemes are preferentially rolled out in majority white neighbourhoods	→ Target higher-income individuals using identity-congruent framing	→ Outreach and incentive campaigns for low-income groups using rental schemes
<b>Role model</b>	Film actor	→ Modelling low-carbon travel choices in high-visibility context	→ Risk of backlash or accusations of hypocrisy	→ Enable actors to join coalitions that offer collective support and visibility	→ Institutionalize sustainability requirements across the entertainment industry

**Fig. 1 | The a-frame includes roles, high-impact behaviours, constraints and intervention pathways.** The a-frame informs intervention design by identifying target populations' roles and context-specific, high-impact behaviours. For each role-behaviour pairing, structural constraints (for example, institutional

barriers) are made explicit. These mappings inform interventions that either leverage existing agency (for example, targeting high-legitimacy populations) or expand agency (for example, creating supportive infrastructures).

Kukowski et al. 2026

Climate debates often frame individual behaviour and systems change as distinct pathways to action. We suggest that social change arises from individuals' agency within their roles in societal systems, and that this agency should be actively leveraged to achieve meaningful climate change mitigation.

**BOX 1**  
Agency in social systems

Agency is commonly understood as the capacity of individuals to act within the social, institutional and material contexts that shape behaviour. In the social sciences, agency and structure were traditionally viewed as incompatible frameworks for understanding

# Soziale Mobilisation am Beispiel FFF (Fabel et al. 2024)

nature human behaviour

Article

<https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-024-02075-4>

## The relationship between the youth-led Fridays for Future climate movement and voting, politician and media behaviour in Germany

Received: 24 July 2023

Accepted: 28 October 2024



Published online: 23 December 2024

Check for updates

Marc Fabel<sup>1</sup>, Matthias Flückiger<sup>2</sup>, Markus Ludwig<sup>3,4</sup>, Helmut Rainer<sup>4,5,6</sup>, Maria Waldinger<sup>4,6</sup> & Sebastian Wichert<sup>4,7</sup>

We study the relationship between the Fridays for Future climate protest movement in Germany and citizen political behaviour. In 2019, crowds of young protesters, mostly under voting age, demanded immediate climate action. Exploiting cell-phone-based mobility data and hand-collected information on nearly 4,000 climate protests, we created a highly disaggregated measure of protest participation. Using this measure, we show that Green Party vote shares increased more in counties with higher protest participation ( $n = 960$ ). To address the possibility of non-random protest participation, we used various empirical strategies. When we examined mechanisms, we found evidence for three relevant factors: reverse intergenerational transmission of pro-environmental attitudes from children to parents ( $n = 76,563$ ), stronger climate-related social media presence by Green Party politicians ( $n = 197,830$ ) and increased local media coverage of environmental issues ( $n = 47,060$ ). Our findings suggest that youth protests may initiate the societal change needed to overcome the climate crisis.

Nachhaltigkeit?



**Fig. 3 | Pre-trends.** Point estimates (dots) and 95% CIs (capped horizontal bars) of the election-cycle-interacted effect of protest participation. Protest participation is standardized so that the mean is 0 and the standard deviation is 1. The dependent variable is the vote share of the Green Party. ‘FFF’ denotes the election cycle after the emergence of the FFF movement, whereas ‘FFF- $z$ ’ denotes the preceding  $z$  election cycles.  $n = 3,979$  unique observations. The measure of centre is the average. Statistics: FFF-4 ( $\beta = -0.084$ ;  $P = 0.444$ ; 95% CI,  $-0.325$  to  $0.155$ ), FFF-3 ( $\beta = 0.257$ ;  $P = 0.249$ ; 95% CI,  $-0.215$  to  $0.729$ ), FFF-2 ( $\beta = 0.131$ ;  $P = 0.586$ ; 95% CI,  $-0.395$  to  $0.658$ ), FFF-1 (baseline), FFF ( $\beta = 0.586$ ;  $P = 0.002$ ; 95% CI,  $0.288$  to  $0.885$ ).

# Anderer Ansatz: Reaktanz „überwinden“ - einfach machen!?




## Psychological reactance to system-level policies before and after their implementation

Armin Granulo<sup>a1</sup>, Christoph Fuchs<sup>b</sup>, and Robert Böhm<sup>c,d,e</sup>

Affiliations are included on p. 9.

Edited by Elke Weber, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ; received May 17, 2024; accepted March 19, 2025




- **Ex-ante:** Antizipierte persönliche Verluste treiben Reaktanz
- **Ex-post:** Gesellschaftliche Gewinne und ausbleibende Verluste hemmen Reaktanz
- **Transient!**
- **Mehr Systemwandel wagen ?! (CAVE!)**

**Fig. 2.** Forest plot of mean differences in psychological reactance to system-level policies before (ex ante) vs. after (ex post) their implementation across Studies 2-4A. Note: Differences in psychological reactance refer to standardized differences. The experimental materials were comparable and varied in policy contexts as described in *Materials and Methods*; thus, the four studies can be understood as conceptual replications. The overall effects were calculated using a random effects model for meta-analysis.  $Q$  and  $I^2$  were used for heterogeneity assessment among the studies. CIs refer to 95% CI.

# Evidenz-informierte und Werte-orientierte Politik

Shift Evidenz -> Intuition in Kongressreden




Aroyehun et al. 2025

EBDM vs EIDM


Evidence-Based Decision making



Evidence-Informed Decision Making



Aryeetey et al. 2017



2022



2024

# Deliberative Demokratie – Partizipation, Ko-Kreation

Received: 11 March 2021 | Revised: 10 September 2021 | Accepted: 16 December 2021  
 DOI: 10.1002/wcc.739

ADVANCED REVIEW



## Deliberative democracy and the climate crisis

Rebecca Willis<sup>1</sup> | Nicole Curato<sup>2</sup> | Graham Smith<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Lancaster Environment Centre, Lancaster, UK  
<sup>2</sup>Centre for Deliberative Democracy and Global Governance, University of Canberra, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, Australia  
<sup>3</sup>Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, London, UK

**Correspondence**  
 Rebecca Willis, Lancaster Environment Centre, Lancaster LA1 4YW, UK.  
 Email: r.willis@lancaster.ac.uk

**Edited by:** Stuart Capstick, Domain Editor and Mike Hulme, Editor-in-Chief

### ABSTRACT


No democratic state has yet implemented a climate plan strong enough to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. This has led some to argue that democracy cannot cope with a challenge of this magnitude. In this article, we take stock of the claim that a more deliberative democratic system can strengthen our ability to respond effectively to the climate crisis. The most visible development in this direction is the recent citizens' assemblies on climate change in Ireland, France, and the UK. We begin our analysis of the promise of deliberative democracy with a recognition of the difficulties that democracies face in tackling climate change, including short-termism; the ways in which scientific and expert evidence are used; the influence of powerful political interests; and the relationship between people and the politicians that represent them. We then introduce the theoretical tradition of deliberative democracy and examine how it might ameliorate the challenges democracies face in responding to the climate crisis. We evaluate the contribution of deliberative mini-publics, such as citizens' assemblies and juries, and look beyond these formal processes to examine how deliberation can be embedded in political and social systems around the world. We conclude that deliberation-based reforms to democratic systems, including but not limited to deliberative mini-publics, are a necessary and potentially transformative ingredient in climate action.

This article is categorized under:

- Perceptions, Behavior, and Communication of Climate Change > Communication
- Policy and Governance > Governing Climate Change in Communities, Cities, and Regions


### KEYWORDS

citizens' assemblies, climate change, deliberative democracy, deliberative mini-publics, democracy



Comelli et al. 2026

# Zukunftsfähigkeit



Gall et al. 2022

- Windows of Opportunity
- Temporal Discounting
- Future-orientation vs. Politische Myopie

## Reflection

### The Future as a Democratic Resource

Jonathan White

Beliefs about the future shape attitudes, experiences, and priorities in the present. This article explores the relationship between democracy and the expected world to come. As it argues, visions of the future are an important resource for democratic politics, putting the present in critical perspective, aiding in the formation of a collective agent, and consolidating commitment in adversity. Indirectly, they contribute also to the legitimacy of democratic institutions, shaping the exercise of citizenship and the capacity to contend with the flaws of representation. The democratic significance of the imagined future becomes even more visible in today's age of skepticism toward future-regarding politics, in which speculative modes of thinking run up against the desire for certainty and precision.

The waning of the future as a political reference point is widely reported today. In their rhetoric and actions, politicians are said to be shifting toward piecemeal forms of problem solving and efforts to preserve a receding status quo. In a book called *The Lost Future*, Jan Zielonka (2023, 137) writes of the ascendancy of those who "have little reassurance to offer about the clouds gathering over our heads, [preferring to] talk about heroic or glorious history... To address the future, you need a strategy and resources, but to address the past you only need rhetorical skills." Such a reading reflects a wider sense that future-regarding politics is an ever-diminishing feature of democratic life (cf. Mackenzie 2021).

This article examines what is at stake in this apparent retreat from the future. How might the future be a democratic resource, and what happens when it is put to one side? What gets lost when the future is lost? Contemporary theoretical discussion tends to approach these temporal matters in terms of ties to the young and the unborn (e.g., Gosses and Meyer 2009). Certainly, the ethics of intergenerational obligation offers powerful reason to care about the place of the future in politics, but this article presents a different approach. If actors have reason to keep the future in sight, it is not just for the sake of the world they leave behind—perspectives on what lies ahead

shape affairs in the moving present. To grasp democracy's relation to the future, one must consider how its practices and institutions reflect the hopes, fears, expectations, and blind spots of the living. Democratic theory needs to expand its gaze beyond the "future present," as it may one day transpire, to the "present future" as it is imagined today (Luhmann 1976).

This article begins by looking more closely at the lost-future thesis. As the first section argues, if there is something distinctive about the outlook of politicians in contemporary western democracies, it is not that they meet the future with indifference. Public officials continue to invest heavily in setting targets for policy and identifying risks. In some ways these concerns are more pronounced than ever, and they have more than a near focus on the coming weeks and months. If future-regarding politics is in some sense diminished, it concerns *how* the future is invoked. Specifically, in question today is the willingness of representatives to develop comprehensive visions of how the future can be positively shaped. We see *policies* for the future but much less often a *politics*. A preoccupation with targets and threats tends to displace a more principled and agential approach. A reactive stance, focused on adapting to the probable and dodging the worst, is typical.

The second section provides an initial analysis of why a comprehensive vision of the future might matter. It argues that broader visions of the future hold particular significance for those committed to social change. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, movements and parties defined themselves by future-oriented programs of reform from which they drew strength in various ways. The "isms" they pioneered combined tangible goals with


Jonathan White is a professor of politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science (j.p.white@lse.ac.uk). His books include *In the Long Run: The Future as a Political Idea* (2024), *Politics of Last Resort: Governing by Emergency in the European Union* (2019), and, with Lea Ypi, *The Meaning of Partisanship* (2016).

doi:10.1017/S1537592724002871

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# Zukunftsfähigkeit



'A novel that presents a rousing vision of how we might unite to overcome the greatest challenge of our time'

TED.com

Futures 163 (2024) 103456



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Envisioning ecopolitical futures: Reading climate fiction as political theory

Sophia Hatzisavvidou


Department of Politics, Languages and International Studies, University of Bath, Claverton Down, BA2 7AY, United Kingdom

## ARTICLE INFO

**Keywords:**  
Climate change  
Climate fiction  
Decolonial theory  
Imagines  
Political theory  
Speculative knowledges

## ABSTRACT

Scholarship on how speculative knowledges can contribute to envisioning sustainable futures is thriving. There is less attention to the specific ways in which political theory as speculative knowledge is relevant to these scholarly discussions. This article fosters this link by suggesting reading climate fiction as political theory. The article follows a four-step analysis. First, it clarifies the importance of pluralising and decolonising the knowledges through which climate change is engaged politically. Second, it introduces the concept of *ecopolitical imaginary* to capture collective visions for sustainable futures, showing the relevance of the theorising endeavour. Third, it elucidates the idea that placing political theory and climate fiction in dialogue can help envisage alternative ecopolitical imaginaries for future world ordering. Finally, it reads Robinson's *Ministry for the Future* as an experiment in political thinking: an ecopolitical imaginary that helps to think through the challenges involved in countering the colonial logic of global climate governance and the Eurocentric universalism underpinning it. The overarching argument is that reading climate fiction as political theory offers insight into envisioning just sustainable futures.



Carter 2026

# Meine zwei Favoriten: Ambiguitätstoleranz und intellektuelle Bescheidenheit



## INTOLERANCE OF AMBIGUITY AS AN EMOTIONAL AND PERCEPTUAL PERSONALITY VARIABLE

ELSE FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK  
*Institute of Child Welfare  
 University of California*


### INTRODUCTION

In recent years there have been an increasing number of attempts to integrate the field of perception with that of motivation and of personality. These attempts may take either of two opposite directions. One is characterized by a basic dependence on the outlook, the problems, and the techniques developed in the general psychology of perception. This approach may be further subdivided in the following manner. The motivational angle is either, first, superimposed upon this nucleus of general problems of perception as an additional element or factor, or second, derived from it by an expansion of concepts or principles originating in the field of perception. Both these subdivisions may be characterized as perception-centered.

The opposite direction is taken by a third group of investigations. These are organized about major patterns of findings originating in some area of personality research, problems or findings of perception-psychology are brought into the picture by way of analogy as convenient means in the testing of hypotheses, or in some other secondary role. This may be called the personality-centered approach.

This is not to say that with the first two cases the primary interest is always in perception, and with the third always in personality. On the contrary, the decisive slant may in each case be given by the new element of thought injected rather than by the core to which this new element is added.

In the present paper the third, personality-centered, approach is applied to concepts and findings originating in the sphere of emotional ambivalence and to their expansion into experiments on perceptual ambiguity proper and on related subjects which had been



Porter et al. 2022

*Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*  
 VOL. 27, NO. 2 · APRIL 2024

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## IS INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY COMPATIBLE WITH POLITICAL CONVICTION?

*Michael Hannon and Ian James Kidd*

Acta Psychologica 250 (2024) 104495

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

Unveiling the perception of politicians' intellectual humility

Martha R. Cooper, Irmak Olcaysoy Okten\*

*Department of Psychology, Florida State University, USA*



# „Ein-Personen-Empirie“ – wo hilft mir die Psychologie?



# Und welchen Impact haben Sie?

- Vertrauen in Vertreter:innen der psychologischen Fächer ist grundsätzlich groß (z.B. Psychologists4Future)
- Evidenz-informierte Kommunikation
- Spagat aus „lauter“ Klarheit und intellektueller Bescheidenheit nach außen
- Werte-basierte Klarheit nach innen





Figure 4.

Comparative perceptions of psychological scientists by the public.



Hutchinson et al. 2022

# Resiliente Demokratie – Mega(behaviorale) Studien

Polity

(Selbst)Verwaltung



PNAS Nexus, 2026, 5, pgaf400

<https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf400>

Advance access publication 27 January 2026

Research Report

## A megastudy of behavioral interventions to catalyze public, political, and financial climate advocacy

Danielle Goldwert <sup>ID a,\*</sup>, Sara M. Constantino <sup>ID b</sup>, Yash Patel <sup>ID b</sup>, Anandita Sabherwal <sup>ID c</sup>, Christoph Semken <sup>ID b,d</sup>, Cameron Brick <sup>ID e</sup>, Anna Castiglione <sup>f</sup>, Ramit Debnath <sup>ID g</sup>, Kimberly C. Doell <sup>ID h</sup>, Rachit Dubey <sup>ID i</sup>, Ke Fang <sup>j</sup>, Matthew H. Goldberg <sup>ID k</sup>, Wei Ji Ma <sup>ID l</sup>, Kristian S. Nielsen <sup>ID m</sup>, Steve Rathje <sup>n</sup>, Claudia R. Schneider <sup>ID o</sup>, Michael Sheldrick <sup>p,q</sup>, Ganga Shreedhar <sup>ID r</sup>, Sander van der Linden <sup>ID s</sup>, Janquel Acevedo <sup>ID t</sup>, Raihan Alam <sup>ID u</sup>, Mélusine Boon-Falleur <sup>ID v</sup>, Ondrej Buchel <sup>ID w</sup>, Xinghui Chen <sup>ID x</sup>, Patricia W. Cheng <sup>ID y</sup>, Adrien Fabre <sup>ID z</sup>, Matthew Feinberg <sup>ID aa</sup>, Joris Frese <sup>ID ab</sup>, Kylie Fuller <sup>ID ac</sup>, Marvin Helferich <sup>ID ad</sup>, Jaroslaw Kantorowicz <sup>ID ae</sup>, Elena Kantorowicz-Reznichenko <sup>ID af</sup>, Allen Kim <sup>ag</sup>, Joan J. H. Kim <sup>ah</sup>, Junho Lee <sup>ID ah</sup>, Artur Marchewka <sup>ID ai</sup>, Matto Mildenerger <sup>ID aj</sup>, Adam Pearson <sup>ID ak</sup>, John-Henry Pezzuto <sup>al</sup>, Veronica Pizziol <sup>ID al</sup>, Marjorie Prokosch <sup>ID am</sup>, John Protzko <sup>ID an</sup>, Guilherme A. Ramos <sup>ID ao,ap</sup>, Willow Rose <sup>ID am</sup>, David K. Sherman <sup>ID aq</sup>, Emma Swanson <sup>ar</sup>, Stylianos Syropoulos <sup>ID as</sup>, Alessandro Tavoni <sup>ID al</sup>, Maximilian H. Thiel <sup>at</sup>, Leaf Van Boven <sup>ID au</sup>, Robb Willer <sup>ID av</sup>, Tao Yang <sup>ID aw</sup>, Dominika Zaremba <sup>ID ai</sup> and Madalina Vlasceanu <sup>ID b,\*</sup>

### RESEARCH


## RESEARCH ARTICLE SUMMARY

### INTERVENTIONS

## Megastudy testing 25 treatments to reduce antidemocratic attitudes and partisan animosity

Jan G. Voelkel<sup>†</sup>, Michael N. Stagnaro<sup>†</sup>, James Y. Chu<sup>†</sup>, *et al.*

2024



Soziales

Etc.

# Zusammenfassung

## ➤ Der Planet und die Demokratie stehen unter Stress

- 6/9 planetaren Grenzen überschritten
- Affektive Polarisierung
- Politische Myopie in Verbindung mit fehlendem, glaubhaftem Zukunftsnarrativ
- Auswirkungen von KI, Desinformation
- Etc.

## ➤ Demokratie stellt durch Möglichkeit der **Selbstwirksamkeit** und **Handlungsfähigkeit** ein **Bindeglied** zwischen **individuellen** und **systemischen Bedarfen** dar

## ➤ Ziel muss sein, diese **Kompetenzen** zu **gewährleisten** und zu **verstärken**

## ➤ **Keine Scheu vor Komplexität** („wicked problems“)

## ➤ **Zukunftsfähigkeit** lernen

## ➤ **Multiple Interventionen** möglich, u.a.

- Mehr deliberative Demokratieelemente
- Soziale Kipppunkte verfolgen
- Ungewissheit kommunizieren und aushalten
- Resonanzräume schaffen (Citizen Assemblies, Climate Cafés (De Jong et al. 2025))

## ➤ **Psychologie** spielt überall eine **wichtige Rolle**



Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), Q: Wikipedia

„Man muss nüchterne, geduldige Menschen schaffen, die nicht verzweifeln angesichts der schlimmsten Schrecken und sich nicht an jeder Dummheit begeistern. Pessimismus des Verstandes, Optimismus des Willens“  
– Gefängnishefte, H. 28, § 11, 2232

# Vielen Dank fürs Zuhören!




Q: Wikipedia




[thomas.goetz@posteo.de](mailto:thomas.goetz@posteo.de)

# Backup

# Multiple Streams



Q: ChatGPT



Howlett et al. 2017

# Werte-orientierte Politik

## APPLYING VALUES AND IDENTITIES TO POLICYMAKING

For any policy initiative, ask yourself 'How does it correspond to citizens' most important values in life?'

This figure will help you think in a structured way about different values based on a model replicated in over 200 samples in 80 countries.

### What are the core values of citizens?

Citizens' values can be divided into four general directions ('higher order values: Self-transcendence, Openness to change, Conservation, Self-enhancement').

#### What to do:

Think about how the policy problem is seen through the lens of each value. For example, how is someone who values Self-enhancement thinking about the facts, what would they like to know? What is their top concern?

### Can we be more precise?

Going deeper will help you design policy that respects citizens' values. Each of the general value directions summarises several personal values.

#### What to do:


- Ask yourself 'What would a preferred solution to the problem look like through each of the values lenses?'
- What solutions would be especially problematic?'
- Are there solutions for all values or is a trade-off needed?'

### How to communicate policies?

Learning about how citizens and politicians describe policies in values terms will help make sense of the debate and communicate better.

#### What to do:

Listen to the debate about the policy issue and identify the values terms used. What values are expressed and how do they relate to each other? Where are values in tension? Apply this in own your communication.



HOW VALUES WORK	
<b>Opposition effect</b>  Openness to change <b>Conservation</b> If one value is very important for a person, he/she is less likely to attach importance to values further away from the circle.	<b>Complementarity effect</b>  Stimulation Hedonism If one value is very important for a person, he/she is more likely to attach importance to nearby values on the circle.
<b>Instantiation effect</b>  Identify the values terms used during the debate Connecting policies to citizens' more effective and more understandable.	<b>Values to social identity</b>  Some people are more prone to be interested in group perspectives than others. Values reflect this fact.

### Keep social identities in mind!

Values are important, but citizens also care about what their social groups think and how they are affected. Social groups include family, local or religious communities, national identity as well as political parties.

#### What to do:

Think about which groups are important to a policy issue, which are likely to enter the debate or be affected.

### What's the big picture in politics?

For each value, studies have shown a correlation to major political attitudes. Knowing these allows you to navigate hotly debated issues.


#### What to do:

Understand the values behind each political attitude and learn how to address them when designing policies.

See full report: Scharf-Billig, M., Smillie, L., Mai, D., Sienkiewicz, M., Keener, J., Pihro Dos Santos, R., Vinagreiro Alves, H., Vecchiarelli, E., Scheuermann, L. Values and Identities - a policymaker's guide. EUR 30800 EN. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2021. KI-NA-30800-EN-N; ISBN 978-92-76-40965-6; ISSN 1831-9424; doi:10.2766/349527\_JRC126150 - <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/61e10101-1109-013-9255>; Schwartz, S. H. (2014). Values and identity process theory (VIT): theoretical integration and empirical elaborations. In R. Jost & G. M. Bruckwell (Eds.), Identity process theory: Identity, social action and social change. Cambridge University Press. Schwartz, S. H., Caprara, G. V., Vecchiarelli, M., Boni, P., Brando, G., Caprara, M. G., Cicchetti, J., Klimoski, H., Rossini, C., Lippa, J. E., Mannix, C., Mars, J., Pankajapur, V., Patrova, T., Schmitt, H., Silvestri, J., Taberner, C., Torres, C., Vermeiren, M., ... Zanna, P. (2014). Basic Personal Values Underlie and Give Coherence to Political Values: A Cross-National Study in 15 Countries. Political Behavior, 36(4), 899-930. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-013-9255-4>; Schwartz, S. H., Cieciuch, J., Vecchiarelli, M., Torres, C., Dolnik-Gurmus, O., & Buhner, T. (2017). Value tradeoffs predict and inhibit behavior: Validating the 19 refined values in four countries. European Journal of Social Psychology, 47(3), 241-258. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2188>

Q: [https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/blog/understanding-values-policy-making-challenges\\_en](https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/blog/understanding-values-policy-making-challenges_en) (2022)

# Psychologische Distanz



Fine 2024

# Die zeitliche Dimension von Politik

*History and Theory* 62, no. 4 (December 2023), 3–23 © 2023 The Authors. *History and Theory* published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Wesleyan University. ISSN: 0018-2656 DOI: 10.1111/hith.12324

## ARTICLE

### THE TIME OF POLITICS, THE POLITICS OF TIME, AND POLITICIZED TIME: AN INTRODUCTION TO CHRONOPOLITICS

FERNANDO ESPOSITO AND TOBIAS BECKER<sup>1</sup>


#### ABSTRACT

Time is so deeply interwoven with all aspects of politics that its centrality to the political is frequently overlooked. For one, politics has its own times and rhythms. Secondly, time can be an object and an instrument of politics. Thirdly, temporal attributes are used not only to differentiate basic political principles but also to legitimize or delegitimize politics. Finally, politics aims at realizing futures in the present or preventing them from materializing. Consequently, the relationship between politics and time encompasses a broad spectrum of phenomena and processes that cry out for historicization. In our introduction to this *History and Theory* theme issue on chronopolitics, we argue that the concept of chronopolitics makes it possible to do this and, in the process, to move the operation of rethinking historical temporalities from the periphery toward the center of historiographical attention as well as to engage in a dialogue with scholars from a wide range of disciplines. To this end, we propose a broad concept of chronopolitics by discussing existing definitions, by distinguishing between three central dimensions of chronopolitics (the time of politics, the politics of time, and politicized time), and by systematizing possible approaches to studying chronopolitics.



- Zeitperspektive(n) in ihren Möglichkeiten und Beschränkungen
- Futures Literacy
- Was ist wann machbar?
- Eigene/Gruppenzeitwahrnehmung
- Zeitwahrnehmung in der Bevölkerung
- Synchronisation
- Etc.

# Nostalgie



Rogenhofer et al. 2022



Public Opinion Quarterly (2024) Vol 88 No 4, 1121-1140

## Nostalgia in Politics

Spencer Goidel<sup>1\*</sup>, Kirby Goidel<sup>2</sup>, Paul M. Kellstedt<sup>3</sup>


<sup>1</sup>Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Auburn University, Auburn, AL, US  
<sup>2</sup>Professor, Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, US  
<sup>3</sup>Professor, Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, US

**Abstract** Throughout the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump promised to voters that, if elected, he would “make America great again.” Trump’s explicitly nostalgic appeal was rooted in the collective perception, shared by at least some voters, that life was better (and simpler) in the past. Nostalgic appeals have a long history in American politics. Trump’s “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) slogan was co-opted from Reagan’s “let’s make America great again.” Despite their long history, we suspect that, as nostalgic appeals have become central to the Republican Party’s messaging, nostalgia-susceptible voters have sorted into the Republican Party. Recently, scholars have attempted to better understand the political consequences of nostalgia on voting for populist parties, both in general and specifically for Donald Trump. We make three contributions to the literature. First, using an open-ended prompt, we consider more carefully what people mean when they say they long for the “good old days.” Second, we use these open-ended responses to inform our measurement of nostalgia and whether it reflects a longing for the past or pessimism about the future. In doing so, we show the importance of religiosity and media consumption (i.e., Fox News) as predictors of individual-level nostalgia. Third, we connect our measure of nostalgia to vote choice during the 2022 midterm election—demonstrating that the effects are broader than support for Donald Trump. Overall, we contend that if one is to fully understand contemporary politics, one needs to know how nostalgia influences political attitudes and behaviors.


Until recently, the field of political science has largely ignored nostalgia and its effect on political behavior; however, the global rise of populist politicians making nostalgic appeals to voters (Betz and Johnson 2004;

\*Corresponding author: Spencer Goidel, Department of Political Science, Auburn University, 8022 Haley Center, Auburn, AL 36849, US; email: goidel@auburn.edu.

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<https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfz005>



Q: Wikipedia



**Fig. 1** Interactive effects of nostalgia and income on well-being. Note: Dashed lines indicate the figures are zoomed in to more easily display the direction of the relationships. The negative relationships between nostalgia and well-being are stronger among lower income households than among higher income households

Newman 2022

# Wicked problems – Komplexität, Unsicherheit und Werte berücksichtigen





Fig. 2.1 Complexity uncertainty and value divergence dimensions (Source Head, 2008, p. 104; 2010b, p. 22)

- Ängste vor Komplexität akzeptieren und reduzieren
- Bei sich und anderen
- Ungewissheit benennen
- Divergierende Werte berücksichtigen
- Gestufte kurz-/mittel-/langfristig erreichbare gemeinsame Ziele als Anker

Head 2022

# Soziale Kipppunkte

Social tipping element	Social tipping intervention	Control parameter	Key actors	GHG emission reduction potential	Dominant social structure level	Estimated time needed to trigger tipping
STE1: Energy production and storage	STI1.1: Subsidy programs	The relative price of fossil-fuel-free energy	Governments, energy ministries, big energy producers (68)	Up to 21% globally in 1 y (68)	National policy (68)	10 to 20 y (including the policy-formative phase) (161)
	STI1.2: Decentralized energy production		Citizens, communities (73), local governments (162), policy makers (163), energy planners (164)	Up to 100% in power supply (61)	Community/town governance (165)	Less than 10 y (81)
STE2: Human settlements	STI2.2: Carbon-neutral cities	The demand for fossil-fuel-free technology	City administration, citizens, and citizen groups (166)	Reduction by 32% in 14 y (91)	Urban governance (91)	Approximately 10 y (91).
STE3: Financial market	STI3.1: Divestment movement	Profitability of fossil fuel exploitation	Financial investors (96)	26% emissions tied to investments of a large Canadian university (167)	Market exchange, enterprise (98)	Very rapid, could occur within hours (142)
STE4: Norms and values system	STI4.1: Recognition of the immoral character of fossil fuels	The perception of fossil fuels as immoral	Peer groups, environmental organizations, youth, opinion leaders (168-170)	Unprecedented	Informal institutions, enforcement through peer groups (171)	30 to 40 y (172)
STE5: Education system	STI5.1: Climate education and engagement	Climate change and impacts awareness	Teachers, climate educators (117), youth (113)	Up to 30% reduction in 2 y in the emissions of the Italian households included in the study (124)	National policy (173)	10 to 20 y (173)
STE6: Information feedback	STI6.1: Emission information disclosure	The number of products and services disclosing their carbon emissions	The business and producers; governments for setting disclosure guidelines and regulations (174)	Up to 10% reduction of emissions in UK households' grocery consumption in a year (175)	Market, exchange (176); enterprise (177)	A few years (178)




Otto et al. 2020

# Resiliente Demokratie – Mega(behaviorale) Studien

## I - Frame

### A megastudy of behavioral interventions to catalyze public, political, and financial climate advocacy

Danielle Goldwert<sup>1,2</sup>, Sara M. Constantino<sup>3</sup>, Yash Patel<sup>4</sup>, Anandita Sabherwal<sup>5</sup>, Christoph Semken<sup>6,7</sup>, Cameron Brick<sup>8</sup>, Anna Castiglione<sup>9</sup>, Kamit Debnath<sup>10</sup>, Kimberly C. Doell<sup>11</sup>, Rachit Dubey<sup>12</sup>, Ke Fang<sup>13</sup>, Matthew H. Goldberg<sup>14</sup>, Wei Ji Ma<sup>15</sup>, Kristian S. Nielsen<sup>16</sup>, Steve Rathje<sup>17</sup>, Claudia R. Schneider<sup>18</sup>, Michael Sheldrick<sup>19</sup>, Ganga Sheelapur<sup>20</sup>, Sander van der Linden<sup>21</sup>, Janquel Acevedo<sup>22</sup>, Raihan Alam<sup>23</sup>, Mélusine Boun-Falheur<sup>24</sup>, Ondrej Buchel<sup>25</sup>, Xinghui Chen<sup>26</sup>, Patricia W. Cheng<sup>27</sup>, Adrien Fabre<sup>28</sup>, Matthew Feinberg<sup>29</sup>, Joris Frese<sup>30</sup>, Kylie Fuller<sup>31</sup>, Marvin Helfertich<sup>32</sup>, Jaroslaw Kantorowicz<sup>33</sup>, Elena Kantorowicz-Reszchenko<sup>34</sup>, Allen Kim<sup>35</sup>, Joan J. H. Kim<sup>36</sup>, Junbo Lee<sup>37</sup>, Artur Marchewka<sup>38</sup>, Matteo Milidenberger<sup>39</sup>, Adam Pearson<sup>40</sup>, John-Henry Pezantou, Veronica Pizzoli<sup>41</sup>, Marjorie Prokocinski<sup>42</sup>, John Proszko<sup>43</sup>, Guilherme A. Ramos<sup>44</sup>, Willow Rose<sup>45</sup>, David K. Sherman<sup>46</sup>, Emma Swanson<sup>47</sup>, Stylianos Syropoulos<sup>48</sup>, Alessandro Tavoni<sup>49</sup>, Maximilian H. Trüffel<sup>50</sup>, Leaf Van Boven<sup>51</sup>, Robb Willer<sup>52</sup>, Tao Yang<sup>53</sup>, Dominika Zarembo<sup>54</sup> and Madalina Vlasceanu<sup>55</sup>




# Resiliente Demokratie – Mega(behaviorale) Studien I-Frame

RESEARCH ARTICLE SUMMARY

INTERVENTIONS


## Megastudy testing 25 treatments to reduce antidemocratic attitudes and partisan animosity

Jan G. Voelkel†, Michael N. Stagnaro†, James Y. Chu†, et al.



**Megastudy identifies many efficacious treatments that reduce partisan animosity and/or antidemocratic attitudes.** Treatment effects on partisan animosity (left), support for undemocratic practices (center), and support for partisan violence (right).

Voelkel et al. 2025



Science  
Current Issue First release papers Archive About Submit manuscript

HOME > SCIENCE > VOL. 392, NO. 6802 > THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE INTERNET CREATES RISKS FOR DEMOCRACY

EXPERT VOICES

## The architecture of the internet creates risks for democracy

STEPHAN LEWANDOWSKY Authors Info & Affiliations

SCIENCE • 4 Jun 2026 • Vol 392, Issue 6802 • DOI:10.1126/science.abe2409

1,881

Will [democracy survive the internet?](#) Do we need to choose between Facebook's sur-

- Digitale Lebenswelten haben Potenzial „bubbles“ zu schaffen, zu verstärken und Lebensrealitäten zu entkoppeln
- Gefahr von Mis-/Desinformationen
- Fähigkeit, Kompromisse auszuhandeln und zu tragen sinkt
- Dadurch Gefahr für demokratisches Miteinander



Available online at [www.sciencedirect.com](http://www.sciencedirect.com)

ScienceDirect

Current Opinion in Psychology

ELSEVIER

## Misinformation and the epistemic integrity of democracy

Stephan Lewandowsky<sup>1,2,3</sup>, Ullrich K. H. Ecker<sup>3</sup>, John Cook<sup>4</sup>, Sander van der Linden<sup>5</sup>, Jon Roozenbeek<sup>5</sup> and Naomi Oreskes<sup>6</sup>

**Abstract**  
Democracy relies on a shared body of knowledge among citizens, for example trust in elections and reliable knowledge to inform policy-relevant debate. We review the evidence for widespread disinformation campaigns that are undermining this shared knowledge. We establish a common pattern by which science and scientists are discredited and how the most recent frontier in those attacks involves researchers in misinformation itself. We list several ways in which psychology can contribute to countermeasures.

**Addresses**  
<sup>1</sup> University of Bristol, Bristol, UK  
<sup>2</sup> University of Potsdam, Germany  
<sup>3</sup> University of Western Australia, Australia  
<sup>4</sup> University of Melbourne, Australia  
<sup>5</sup> University of Cambridge, UK  
<sup>6</sup> Harvard University, USA

Corresponding author: Lewandowsky, Stephan ([stephan.lewandowsky@bristol.ac.uk](mailto:stephan.lewandowsky@bristol.ac.uk))  
URL: <http://www.cogsciwa.com>

**Current Opinion in Psychology** 2023, 54:101711  
This review comes from a themed issue on **The Psychology of Misinformation (2024)**  
Edited by **Gordon Pennycook** and **Lisa K. Fazio**  
For complete overview about the section, refer **The Psychology of Misinformation (2024)**  
Available online 19 October 2023  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2023.101711>  
2352-250X/© 2023 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>).

**Keywords**  
Integrity of democracy, Attacks on scientists, Climate science, Misinformation.

*"I've won two Elections, the second far bigger than the first (it was Rigged!)"*  
— Donald J. Trump, 22 May 2023

*"Despite having lost, the Defendant was determined to remain in power. ... the Defendant spread lies that there had been ...*

**Attacks on procedures and processes**  
Citizens must know that power will be transferred peacefully if an incumbent is voted out of office [1]. The fact that 28% of American conservatives do not support a peaceful transfer of power [2], and that more than half of Republican voters continue to question the legitimacy of President Biden's electoral win in 2020, must therefore cause concern. A CNN poll in August 2023 [3] found that 69% of Republicans questioned the legitimacy of President Biden's electoral win, with more than half of those (57%) believing that there was solid evidence for their view.

However, no such evidence exists and the widespread doubt about the integrity of the 2020 election is primarily the result of an extensive disinformation campaign by the loser of the election, Donald Trump, and his supporting infrastructure [4]. The origins of this campaign can be traced back to 2016 [5]. Several scholars have noted that the "big lie" that the 2020 election was "stolen" from Donald Trump attacks the core of American democracy and puts pressure on Republican lawmakers to cater to antidemocratic forces [4,5].

**Attacks on evidence-informed policy making**  
Democracy also requires reliable shared knowledge to ensure normatively good outcomes. From the perspective of an epistemic theory of democracy [6], democracy

[www.sciencedirect.com](http://www.sciencedirect.com) Current Opinion in Psychology 2023, 54:101711

# Demokratie – Internet – Social Media - KI

Perspective



Summerfield et al. 2025

<https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-025-02309-z>

Table 1 | What do we know, and what do we need to know, about AI and democracy?

Theme	What do we know so far?	What do we need to know?
<b>Political bias (epistemic)</b>	Most current AI models are politically biased towards progressive/libertarian views when assessed with multiple-choice questions <sup>12-14</sup> , but will typically provide a balanced political view when responding freely <sup>17</sup>	How does interacting with AI models affect the user's political attitudes? Will AI tip the political balance in one direction or another?
<b>Persuasive messaging and dialogue (epistemic)</b>	Current AI models can be highly persuasive in experimental settings <sup>11,32</sup> , especially when generating lots of fact-checkable claims <sup>33</sup>	How are persuasive AI models being deployed in the wild, and how persuasive are they outside of an experimental context?
<b>Political polarization (epistemic)</b>	Current AI models are prone to 'sycophancy', aligning their expressed views or preferences with those of the user <sup>11</sup> , and this may increase as models become more personalized <sup>48</sup>	Will increasing personalization of AI models lead to increasing political polarization, creating new opportunities for 'filter bubbles'?
<b>Deliberation and consensus (epistemic)</b>	AI models can be deployed to help people to find common ground, by summarizing arguments and suggesting compromise positions <sup>26,62,133</sup>	Can AI be used to meaningfully advance policy negotiation or conflict resolution in a fair and beneficial way?
<b>Information and misinformation (epistemic)</b>	AI models often generate misleading content that is hard to detect <sup>72,73</sup> , and this can be exploited by malicious actors to distort the political process <sup>91</sup> , but AI systems are also useful for fact-checking <sup>87,134</sup>	Will the widespread introduction of AI models ultimately help or harm the information environment? Will people prove resilient to fake AI-generated content? Will the digital commons be overwhelmed by 'slop'?
<b>Electoral disruption (material)</b>	AI models can assist with 'hack and leak' and spear-phishing campaigns <sup>93,94</sup>	Will we see widespread AI interference in electoral processes in the future, especially from agentic systems? What safeguards should we put in place to prevent this from happening?
<b>Voter suppression (material)</b>	AI models are being used to automate the rejection of voting applications, often based on unreliable evidence <sup>97</sup> , and to profile and target journalists and activists <sup>103</sup>	Can AI agents be used to identify likely voting preferences and target individuals in ways that decrease their opportunity for democratic participation?
<b>Augmenting political decision-making (material)</b>	AI is already being deployed in the public sector, including to write policy and streamline governance mechanisms <sup>104</sup> , as well as for expert polling <sup>107</sup>	Will the political writing and delegated decision-making of AI models distort the preferences of policymakers in detrimental ways?
<b>Power concentration (foundational)</b>	AI development is dominated by a few large technology firms <sup>16,120</sup> ; in some countries, AI is already being widely deployed for surveillance and population control <sup>135</sup>	Will we eventually see a unipolar or multipolar AI developments landscape? Does the arrival of advanced AI fundamentally favour authoritarian over democratic regimes, by offering new opportunities for state control?
<b>Labour market disruption (foundational)</b>	AI models are already affecting the graduate labour market <sup>120</sup>	Will AI create substantial growth? If so, will it benefit everyone, or will it dramatically exacerbate inequality? Will any changes to the labour market arrive rapidly or slowly?

The table summarizes the evidence presented in this Perspective, and outlines suggestions for future research that will move the field forwards.



➤ Janusgesicht KI

➤ Undemokratisches Framing und fehlende Regulierung geht mit erheblichen Risiken einher (Saeri et al. 2026)

# Klimawandel und Konflikte






Figure 1. The impacts of climate change (e.g., higher temperature, drought, extreme precipitation, and disasters) on conflict risk can be amplified through economic shocks, agricultural decline, natural resources competition, and migration.

Xie et al. 2024



Ragoobur et al. 2026


Fig. 3. Summary of cascading impact of active conflict on GHG emissions. A: Military logistics transporting weapons (Lakhani, 2024). B: Open burn pits emit a cocktail of carbon-bearing particles and particulate matter (Mitroo et al., 2024; Trembley et al., 2024). C: Landscape and urban fires (de Klerk et al., 2023; Bun et al., 2024). D: Forest fires (Zibisev et al., 2024). E: Hauling of resources and reconstruction in post-conflict (Michaelowa et al., 2022; de Klerk et al., 2022; Neimark et al., 2024a, 2024b). F: Waste-related emissions (Bun et al., 2024). G: Movement of refugees (de Klerk et al., 2022). H: Diversion of airlines and shipping lines (de Klerk et al., 2023). I: Agricultural expansion related to active conflicts (Swintek, 2006). J: Dispersion of aerosol into the atmosphere resulting in acid rain in neighbouring states and distant states (Tazaki et al., 2004).




Krampe et al. 2026

- Klimakrise ist auch direkter/indirekter Risikofaktor für bewaffnete Konflikte
- Bewaffnete Konflikte/Kriege belasten die Umwelt erheblich
- Post-Konflikt Recovery in Bezug auf umwelt-/klimapolitische Handlungsfähig sehr verzögert (20-30 Jahre)

# Klimawandel als Katastrophe – The climate endgame



Q: Wikipedia



- Vom schlimmsten annehmbaren Szenario her denken
- Betont Dringlichkeit und ermöglicht Entwicklung von Interventionen
- Gute Kommunikation zu diesem Ansatz wichtig
- Kein Nihilismus sondern Handlungsimpuls